NU, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia

Muslimedianews.com ~ Nahdlatul Ulama, with a membership said to number around 80 million (2017), is the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia. It is also, as Martin van Bruinessen has observed, without parallel in the Islamic world as a genuinely mass-based organisation under the leadership of ulama (religious scholars). Despite the organisation's size and distinctiveness this is the first Englishlanguage book on NU to be published.

NU was founded on 31 January 1926 in Surabaya by a group of eminent ulama (religious scholars), most of whom were leaders of pesantren (rural Islamic boarding schools). Their aim was to give organisational voice to the interests of traditional Islam, and particularly the pesantren system. During the 1920s many ulama felt concern over the rapid growth of Islamic modernism and its success in attracting Muslims away from the traditionalist sphere of learning and practice.  NU's history can be divided into three broad phases: an initial period as a socio-religious organisation; a middle period when it functioned either as a political party or formal component of a party; and most recently, its return to social-religious activities. NU was founded as ajamiah diniah or religious organisation. Its original constitution committed the organisation to a range of religious, social, educational, and economic activities, including improving communication between ulama, upgrading Islamic schools, vetting texts for use in pesantren, and establishing bodies to advance Muslim farming and trading ventures. NU grew rapidly throughout the pre-war period. In 1933 it claimed a membership of 40,000; by 1938 this had swelled to 100,000 spread across 99 registered branches. It also grew in organisational complexity. In 1934, a youth wing was founded under the name Ansor. Four years later, a separate women's division, Muslimat NU, was formally established, along with an educational institute, Lembaga Pendidikan Ma'arif. During this period, it also set up a trading cooperative known as Syirkah Mu'awanah. 
NU's involvement in political activities came gradually and reluctantly. From the late 1930s, it joined with other Islamic organisations in campaigning against colonial government regulations which were seen as inimical to Islam. It also supported the formation of GAPI (Gabungan Politik indonesia or Indonesian Political Association) and its call for the establishment of an Indonesian parliament in 1939. It was not until 1945, however, that NU entered formal politics as an organisational member of the Islamic party Masyumi. Increasing frustration with modernist domination of Masyumi led to NU's withdrawal from the party in 1952. It transformed itself into an independent party and emerged as the third-largest contestant at the 1955 general election with 18% of the national vote (only 4% behind the first-ranked party). NU maintained this level of support at the following general election in 1971. It also participated in every cabinet from 1953 to 1971.  During the Sukarno period NU acquired a reputation for political flexibility and accommodation. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, NU reversed or modified earlier policies and undertakings in order to maintain its position within the government. The most notable of these was its acquiescence to the dismantling of parliamentary democracy and introduction of Sukarno's Guided Democracy from 1957 to 1959. Following the attempted coup of 1965, NU joined with the army in the bloody elimination of the Indonesian Communist Party, and supported the rise to power of the New Order government under MajorGeneral Soeharto. Although it had expected to be a significant partner in the new regime NU soon found itself a victim of the New Order's de-Islamisation of politics. It became the target of government restrictions and intimidation during the 1971 general election campaign and in 1973 was compelled to amalgamate with three other Islamic parties to form the United Development Party (PPP). During this period NU became a major source of opposition to the government.
 NU's involvement in party politics ceased in 1984. Increasingly marginalised within PPP and worn down by government harassment, NU left the PPP and reverted to its original socio-religious status. A new leadership team came to power, the principal figures of which were Kiai Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid. They proclaimed NU's return to the khittah 1926, that is the strategy of activity set out by the organisation's founding fathers, and embarked on a range of community welfare and economic development programmes. Relations with the government improved markedly after NU agreed to its demands to accept the national ideology, Pancasila, as the organisation's sole foundation. 
 There have been surprisingly few studies made of Nahdlatul Ulama. In the vast scholarly literature on Indonesia which emerged from the 1950s and 1960s, there was not a single article, monograph or doctoral dissertation devoted exclusively to NU. This was in marked contrast to the quantity of writing on other major social and political organisations such as Muhammadiyah, Masyumi, the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. This lack of academic interest reflected the ideological and intellectual preoccupations of scholars of Indonesian Islam during this period. Most were either modernist Muslims or western researchers who favoured investigating and promoting those elements in Indonesian society which were seen as'modem-minded', 'rational', and technically or professionally skilled. Traditionalist Muslims, with their emphasis on classical Islamic learning and observing cultural traditions, tended to be regarded with scepticism and disdain. They were portrayed as Politically naive and opportunistic, administratively inept, and venal. For most scholars of this period, NU's traditionalist leaders were dismissed as largely irrelevant to the task of modernising Indonesia.   It was not until the early 1970s that foreign scholars Undertook serious study of NU. The writings of Ken Ward, Ben Anderson and Mitsuo Nakamura did much to stimulate academic interest in the organisation, as also did the work of emerging traditionalist intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Choirul Anam and Arief Mudatsir (see the select bibliography). The quantity and variety of research on NU-related topics has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s. This book is representative of the recent research on NU by nonIndonesian scholars.  The nine chapters in this volume are arranged in approximate chronological order and span the period from the early traditionalist organisations which preceded NU in the 1910s through to 1995. The focus of all but two chapters, however, is on the period from the late 1970s.  NU congresses form the basis of four chapters. These quinquennial congresses have supreme decision-making authority within NU and their proceedings reveal a great deal about the organisation's thinking and culture. They witness often frank debate about its activities since the previous congress and determine NU leadership and policy on a wide array of religious, political and social issues for the ensuing five-year period. Given NU's size and influence, congressional decisions frequently have a significance that extends far beyond the organisation itself. Unlike many other major Indonesian organisations, NU has generally weIcomed outside observers to its congresses and imposed few restrictions upon access to delegates or proceedings. As a result, the authors of these chapters have been able to observe the four congresses from 1979 at close hand. There are several related themes and issues which recur throughout the book. The first of these concerns the nature of NU's political ideology and behaviour Critics have often accused the organisation of being motivated by material and social advancement rather than by religious principles. Various contributors to this collection argue, however, that NU's political outlook is greatly shaped by classical Islamic thought. They consider the content of this classical heritage as well as differences of opinion within NU over interpretation and application- This discussion serves to explain NU's swings from political pragmatism and accommodation to militancy and idealism.
 A second theme concerns the nature of leadership and distribution of power' within NU? An analogy is often drawn between leadership of a pesantren and that of NU: just as the kiai enjoys absolute authority within his pesantren so too are a relatively small number of kiai said to dominate decision-making in NU. Although few scholars would dispute the hegemony of ulama, the more vexed issue is the degree to which NU's leadership reflects the interests and aspirations of the broader traditionalist community. There are three NU leaders who are subject to close study in this book: Wahab Chasbullah, Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahab and Abdurrahman, in particular, have frequently been portrayed by their detractors as autocrats who have imposed their will upon a reluctant or uncomprehending mass membership. In examining the role of these leaders, contributors have analysed their bases of power and use of traditionalist concepts and symbols to attract support.  The final theme is that of NU's response to social change and modernity. Traditionalist Muslims have commonly been portrayed as innately conservative and suspicious of change. Adjectives used to describe NU have included kolot (oldfashioned) and jumud (unbending, resistant to change). It is apparent in many chapters of this book, however, that traditionalists have adapted quickly and, at times, creatively to changed social and political conditions. Considerable evidence is adduced, moreover, to show that NU's attitudes to change and modernity are not monolithic. Indeed, for much of the organisation's history the struggle between reformist and conservative streams has dominated its internal dynamics.  In chapter one Greg Fealy examines the life and thought of Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, a co-founder of NU and one of the most influential traditionalist leaders of this century. In describing  Wahab's formative years, he identifies those elements which typified the educational and career experiences of young traditionalist ulama and those which deviated from them. Particular attention is given to exploring the nature of Wahab's  authority within the organisation and the manner in which he drew upon Sunni traditions of political quietism in leading NU towards pragmatic and accommodationist policies during the 1950s and early 1960s.  
Andree Feillard analyses NU's political behaviour during the transition from Guided Democracy to the Soeharto regime in the mid- to late 1960s. She looks at the changing relationship between army and NU, especially in the context of the growing controversy over the formal role of Islam within the emerging New Order political system. The divisions within NU's leadership during this period are also closely examined.  The two contributions by Mitsuo Nakamura deal with the period from 1979 to 1984. His article on the 1979 Congress in Semarang (chapter three) was originally published in 1981 and is notable as the first scholarly account of an NU congress. In addition to describing the proceedings and ambiance of this congress, Nakamura analyses the relationship between NU's political behaviour and its religious ideology. He is especially interested in explaining NU's shift from 'opportunism' during Guided Democracy to radicalism in the New Order. He argues that the organisation's demeanour is contingent upon whether it perceives general social and political conditions to be favourable or antipathetic to Islamic values. Hence, NU cooperated with a Sukarno regime which granted concessions to Muslims, but opposed what it saw as the repressive and anti-Islamic aspects of the Soeharto government. He also provides a reflective critique of the prevailing academic bias against traditional Islam.  Nakamura's second contribution (chapter four) complements the first. It focuses on the three critical events of the early 1980s: the 1982 crisis surrounding Idham Chalid's leadership; the 1983 National Ulama Conference; and the 1984 NU Congress in Situbondo. Nakamura also analyses the formulation and intellectual foundations of NU's pemulihan Khittah 1926, the restoration of NU's founding program of social and religious activity, and considers the organisation's plans for using pesantren as launching points for village-level socio-economic development activities.
 In the fifth chapter Greg Barton provides a translation of and introductory remarks upon the writings and statements of Kiai Achmad Siddiq, NU's rais am from 1984 to 1991. Siddiq was a major force behind the organisation's shift from political to community-oriented activities in the early 1980s. 
The chapter contains excerpts from his seminal 1979 work Khitthah Nahdliyah and also a series of interviews published in 1985 under the title Islam, Pancasila and Ukhuwah Islamiyah. The topics covered include the role of ulama in NU and Indonesian society, traditionalist attitudes towards tawassuth (middle way) and ijtihad (personal interpretation), and the relationship between Pancasila and Islam.
 The first of Martin van Bruinessen's contributions (chapter six) examines the NU Congress. He offers a detailed description of the internal politics surrounding the re-election of Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid before considering the debate over policy issues. As part of the latter discussion, he looks at the differing definitions of and approaches to NU's 'social concerns' (syu'un ijtima'iyah) agenda, including attitudes to banking and rural development strategies.
 In the following chapter, van Bruinessen analyses broader religious and intellectual changes in traditional Islam. He challenges the stereotype of immutable traditionalism, arguing that it has a demonstrated capacity for evolution and innovation. The defining elements of NU's doctrine and devotional practises are described and the author notes the growing convergence between traditional and modernist beliefs. Van Bruinessen is particularly concerned to examine ways in which notions of the past and tradition are used by reformminded traditionalists to bring about change in NU. He looks at the reformulation of the khittah by Achmad Siddiq and a new generation of leaders as well as the renewed emphasis upon issues such as community dialogue, social justice and economic development. 
 Chapters eight and nine focus on the thought and career of Abdurrahman Wahid. Greg Barton provides a brief biographical overview of Abdurrahman's early life before analysing his writings and intellectual development during the 1970s and early 1980s. Barton asserts that Abdurrahman can only be fully uderstood as a committed religious thinker, and not simply as an activist and leader. He argues that Ahdurrahman's writings throughout this period display a consistent conviction that Islam, if rightly interpreted and applied, is essentially liberal and progressive, and that reform and adaptation must be the ongoing Concern of Islamic communities.  Douglas Ramage brings a political science perspective to his analysis of Abdurrahman Wahid's philosophy and approach to political issues in the early 1990s (chapter nine). He concentrates on three key issues: democratisation, religious tolerance and Pancasila. Ramage deals with Abdurrahman's objections to the government's use of Islam and Pancasila to  entrench its own legitimacy and sets out his aspirations for a Pluralistic, 'de-confessionalised' Political culture in Indonesia. He examines Abdurrahman's critique of ICMI as an organisation with sectarian tendencies and also his involvement in Forum Demokrasi. This raises fundamental questions about the formal position of Islam and NU in the Indonesian state and the direction of political reform.
 The final chapter deals with the controversial 1994 NU congress at Cipasung and the bitter repercussions of the following year. Greg Fealy places these events in the context of the growing uncertainty over Presidential succession and the future of the New Order regime. He reviews Abdurrahman Wahid's first two terms as NU chairman and his deteriorating relationship with President Soeharto. The alliance between antiAbdurrahman forces within NU and sections of the government, army and ICMI is closely analysed. Fealy concludes that Abdurrahman's victory reaffirmed NU's independence from the government and its potential to influence the transition to a post-Soeharto era.
 The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies at Monash University, and its Research Director, Professor David Chandler. The genesis for this book was a conference in September 1991 called Contemporary Trends in Indonesian Islam which was organised by Greg Barton and sponsored by the Centre. Papers presented at this conference by Martin van Bruinessen, Mitsuo Nakamura and Greg Barton have formed the basis for three chapters of this collection. We are also grateful to Martin van Bruinessen for his helpful suggestions when the project was in its formative stages. Finally, we would like to thank our colleague Natalie MobiniKesheh for proofreading the text and Daniela Mariani, the Monash Asia Institute's Publications Officer, for her technical advice and patience in helping us prepare this manuscript.   First published 1996 by  Monash Asia Institute'  Monash University, Clayton VIC 3168; Australia

NU is a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia

Muslimedianews.com ~ THE NU IS ONE OF THE LARGEST INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE WORLD
Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia, which also has a larger Muslim population than any other country in the world, with approximately 202.9 million identified as Muslim (88.2% of Indonesia’s total population of 237 million). 
The majority adheres to the Sunni Muslim tradition mainly of the Shafi’i madhhab.
Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars) Nahdlatul Ulama (also Nahdatul Ulama or NU) is a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia. The NU was established on January 31, 1926.
The NU is one of the largest independent Islamic organizations in the world. Some estimates of its membership range as high as 80 million, although it is hard to account for this number. NU acts as a charitable body, helping to fill in many of the shortcomings of the Indonesian government in society; it funds schools, hospitals, and organizes communities or kampungs into more coherent groups in order to help combat poverty.
The Nahdlatul Ulama  was established by Hasjim Asjari (Hadlratusy Syaikh KH. Hasyim Asy’ari), the head of an Islamic religious school in East Java The organization expanded, but the base of its support remained in East Java. By 1928, the NU was using the Javanese language in its sermons, alongside Arabic.
The NU exists to spread Islamic teaching. As well as preaching, it undertakes educational activities through its network of 6,830 Islamic boarding schools, or pesantren. It also owns 44 universities, and is involved in economic and agricultural studies, and social activities including family planning.
The highest body in the NU is the Supreme Council (Syuriah). Under this is the Executive Council (Tanfidziyah).[MMN/Muslimedianews.com]

How a Syrian White Helmets’ Leader Played Western Media. 'Funded Heavily by U.S. State Department and British Foreign Office'

Muslimedianews.com ~ The White Helmets, founded to rescue victims trapped under the rubble of buildings destroyed by Syrian and Russian bombing, have become a favorite source for Western news media covering a story on Russian-Syrian bombing. Portrayed as humanitarian heroes for over the past year and even nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize last summer, the White Helmets have been accorded unquestioned credibility by journalists covering the Syrian crisis.


Yet the White Helmets are hardly a non-political organization. Funded heavily by the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office, the group operates only in areas in northern Syria controlled by an al Qaeda affiliate and their extremist allies—areas to which Western journalists have not had access. Given that the White Helmets work under the authority of those who hold the real power in east Aleppo and other opposition-controlled zones, the Western media’s reliance on this organization for information comes with serious risks of being manipulated.

The highly political role played by the White Helmets in relation to foreign press coverage was dramatically demonstrated after the attack on a Syrian Red Crescent truck convoy in the rebel held area of Urum al-Kubra, just west of Aleppo on September 19. The assault took place immediately after a ceasefire agreed to by Russia, the U.S. and the Syrian government was shattered by a deadly U.S. air attack on Syrian army forces battling ISIS around the city of Deir Ezzor on September 17.

The Obama administration assumed the attack was an airstrike and immediately blamed it on Russian or Syrian aircraft. An unidentified U.S. official told the New York Times that there was “a very high probability” that a Russian plane was near the area just before the attack, but the administration did not make public any evidence in support of that claim. In the days following the attack, news media coverage relied heavily on accounts provided by the White Helmets. The head of the organization in Aleppo, Ammar Al-Selmo, was offering them a personal on-the-scene account.

Selmo’s version of the story turned out to be riddled with falsehoods; however, many journalists approached it without an ounce of skepticism, and have continued to rely on him for information on the ongoing battles in and around Aleppo.

Changing stories while the press plays along

The first detail on which Selmo’s testimony revealed itself as dishonest is his claim about where he was located at the moment the attack began. Selmo told Time Magazine the day after the attack that he was a kilometer or more away from the warehouse where the aid convoy trucks were parked at that point—presumably at the local White Helmet center in Urm al-Kubra. But Selmo changed his story in an interview with the Washington Post published September 24, stating he was “making tea in a building across the street” at that moment.

Even more dramatically, Selmo claimed at first that he saw the beginning of the attack. According to the story published by Time on September 21, Selmo said he was drinking tea on the balcony when the bombing began, and “he could see the first barrel bombs falling from what he identified as a Syrian regime helicopter.”

But Selmo could not have seen a barrel bomb falling from a helicopter or anything else at that moment. In a video shot early the next morning, Selmo declared that the bombing had started at about 7:30pm. In later statements, the White Helmets put the time at 7:12pm. But sunset on September 19 was at 6:31pm, and by roughly 7pm, Aleppo was shrouded in complete darkness.

Someone evidently called Selmo’s attention to that problem after the Time story was published, because by the time he gave his account to the Washington Post, he had changed that part of the story as well. The Post reported his amended account as follows: “Stepping onto a balcony just after 7pm, when it was already past dusk, he said he listened to a helicopter swoop in and drop two barrel bombs on the convoy.”

In videos the White Helmets made the night of the attack, Selmo went even further, asserting on one segment of the video that four barrel bombs had been dropped and in another, that eight barrel bombs had been dropped. The idea that barrel bombs were used in the attack was immediately picked up by self-styled “media activists” on behalf of the opposition authorities in Aleppo the following morning, as the BBC reported. That theme was in line with an effort by opposition sources going back to 2012 to identify “barrel bombs” as uniquely destructive weapons, more reprehensible than conventional missiles.

Questionable evidence from partisan sources

In a video the White Helmets produced the night of the attack, Selmo addresses viewers by pointing at the indentation of the supposed bomb blast. “You see the box of the barrel bomb?” he asks. But what is shown in the video is a rectangular indentation in the gravel or rubble that appears to be about a foot deep two feet wide and a little more than three feet long. He reaches under the surface and pulls out what look like a damaged shovel blade, based on its shape.

That scene clearly proves Selmo’s claim to have been completely false. Barrel bombs make very large round craters at least 25 feet wide and more than 10 feet deep, so the box-like indentation in the video bore no resemblance whatever to a barrel bomb crater.

Hussein Badawi, who is the local White Helmets director of Urum al-Kubra, is clearly lower than Selmo in the organization’s hierarchy. Badawi appeared briefly next to Selmo in one segment of the video made that night but remains silent, then disappeared. Nevertheless, Badawi directly contradicted Selmo’s claim that the first explosions that night were from barrel bombs. In a White Helmets video that was translated from Arabic into English, Badawi described those first explosions not as airstrikes but as “four consecutive rockets” near the center of the Red Crescent compound at Urum al-Kubra.

No other visual evidence of a crater such as would have been created by a barrel bomb has come to light. In support of Selmo’s assertion, The Russian-based Conflict Intelligence Team, which is dedicated to refuting Russian government claims, could only cite the video frame of Selmo holding up that single piece of metal.

The Bellingcat website, whose founder Eliot Higgins is a non-resident fellow of the militantly anti-Russian, State Department-funded Atlantic Council, and has no technical expertise on munitions, pointed to the same frame. Higgins claimed that the piece of metal came from a “crater.” He also cited a second photograph that he said showed a “repaired crater” in the road next to a burnt-out truck. But the area in the photograph that appeared to be covered with fresh dirt is clearly no more than three feet long and a bit more two feet wide—again far too small to be evidence of a barrel bomb explosion.

Selmo’s White Helmet team also distributed to Bellingcat and media outlets what appeared at first glance to be visual evidence of Syrian and Russian air attacks: the crumpled tailfin of a Russian OFAB-250 bomb, which can be seen under the boxes in a photograph taken inside a warehouse at the site. Bellingcat cited those photographs as clinching evidence of Russian use of that bomb in the attack on the aid convoy.

But that photographs of the OFAB tailfin is extremely problematic as evidence of an airstrike. If an OFAB-250 bomb had actually exploded at that point it would have left a crater that was much larger than the one shown is that photograph. The standard rule of thumb is that an OFAB-250, like other any other conventional bomb weighing 250kg would make a crater 24 to 36 feet wide and 10 or 12 feet deep. The magnitude of its crater is shown in a video of a Russian journalist standing in one after the battle for the Syrian city of Palmyra, which had been held by ISIS.

Furthermore, the wall in the photograph only a few feet from the supposed point of impact was clearly not affected by the bomb. That indicates that either no OFAB-250 was dropped in that spot or it was a dud. But the picture of the boxes surrounding the OFAB tailfin also reveals other evidence that there was an explosion. As one observer discovered from a close examination, the boxes display evidence of shrapnel tears. A closeup of one package shows a pattern of fine shrapnel holes.

Only something much less powerful than an OFAB-250 bomb or a barrel bomb would account for those observable facts. One weapon whose shrapnel could cause the pattern seen in the photograph is the Russian S-5 rocket, two variants of which throw out either 220 or 360 small shrapnel fragments.

In the video he made the night of the attack, Selmo had already claimed that Russian aircraft fired S-5s at the site, although he mistakenly called them “C-5s.” And a photograph of two S-5 missiles was also distributed to Bellingcat and to news organizations, including the Washington Post. Selmo insisted to Timemagazine that the airstrikes were divided between barrel bombs and missiles fired by Russian jets.

But again Badawi, the White Helmets chief for Urum al Kubra, contradicted Selmo in a separate video, stating that the initial barrage of missiles were launched from the ground. Badawi’s admission was very significant, because the Syrian opposition forces have had supplies of Russian S-5s ever since the weapons were smuggled out of Libya to the rebels in large numbers in 2012. They have been using S-5s as ground-launched rockets like the Libyan rebels did, and have designed their own improvised launchers for them.

Badawi claimed the initial four missiles had been fired by Syrian government forces from the defense factories in southern Aleppo governorate. But the government defense plants in southern Aleppo governorate are in al-Safira—more than 25 kilometers away, whereas the S-5s have a range of only 3 to 4 kilometers.

Even more telling is that fact that, despite Selmo’s insistence that airstrikes continued for hours and included as many as 20 to 25 distinct attacks, none of the members of the White Helmet team captured a single airstrike in a video, which would have provided clear audio-visual evidence of his claim.

The Atlantic Council’s Bellingcat site pointed to a video posted online by opposition sources in Aleppo as providing such audio evidence of jet planes just before the nighttime explosions. But despite a voice on the video declaring that it was a Russian airstrike, the sound stops immediately after the fiery explosion, indicating that it was caused by a ground launched missile, not a missile fired from a jet plane. Thus the confirming evidence of an airstrike claimed by Bellingcat did not actually confirm it at all.

Despite a record of distortions, Selmo remains the go-to source

Whoever was responsible for the attack on the Syrian Red Crescent aid convoy, it is clear that Ammar al-Selmo, the top White Helmet official in Aleppo, lied about where he was when the attack on the aid convoy began and, at least initially, misled his audience when he said he witnessed the first stages of the attack with his own eyes. What’s more, he made claims of Syrian barrel bombs and Russian OFAB-250 bombs dropped on the convoy that are not supported by any credible evidence.

In light of Selmo’s readiness to embellish his account and to support the narrative of a Russian-Syrian attack, Western media should have been far more careful about relying on it as confirming the U.S. charge about the aid convoy attack. But during the weeks of heavy Russian and Syrian bombing in eastern Aleppo that followed the breakdown of the ceasefire, Selmo was frequently quoted by the news media as a source on the bombing campaign. And Selmo exploited the new situation to push the rebels’ political agenda.

On September 23, the White Helmets told the news media that three of their four operating centers in east Aleppo had been hit and two of them were out of commission. National Public Radio quoted Selmo as saying he believed the group had been deliberately targeted, because he had “intercepted pilots’ communications and heard them getting orders to bomb his colleagues.” Curiously, NPR failed to identify Selmo as the head of the White Helmets in east Aleppo, identifying him only as a “White Helmets member.”

Five days later the Washington Post reported a similar claim by Ismail Abdullah, another White Helmets official working directly under Selmo. “Sometimes we hear the pilot tell his base, ‘We see a market for the terrorists, there is a bakery for the terrorists,’” said Abdullah. “Is it okay to hit them? They say, ‘Okay, hit them.’” He further claimed that on September 21, the White Helmets had heard an enemy pilot refer to the “terrorist” civil defense centers. The organization sent a message to U.S. officials in New York for the U.N. General Assembly that they were being targeted, Abdullah added. These dramatic stories helped propel the White Helmets’ campaign for the Nobel Peace Prize, which was announced days later but which they ultimately did not win.

The claim that the White Helmets had overheard pilots asking for and receiving permission to hit targets while in the air is a fabrication, according to Pierre Sprey, a former Pentagon analyst on combat aircraft who played a central role in designing the F-16. “It’s inconceivable that this could have been an authentic communication between an attack pilot and a controller,” Sprey told AlterNet, referring to Selmo’s accounts. “The only time a pilot might initiate a request to hit a target is if he sees gunfire from it. Otherwise it makes no sense.”

The day after the Russian and Syrian bombing campaign on rebel-held eastern Aleppo began on September 22, Reuters turned to Selmo for an overall assessment of the bombing’s impact on Aleppo. Selmo bluntly declared, “What’s happening now is annihilation.”

Following this dramatic statement, Western media continued to cite Selmo as though he were a neutral source. On September 26, Reuters went back to the White Helmets working under him  again, citing an estimate by unnamed “civil defense workers” in Aleppo — which could only mean members of the White Helmets —  that 400 people had already been killed in less than five days of bombing in and around Aleppo. But after three full weeks of bombing the United Nations and other agencies estimated that 360 people had been killed in the bombing, suggesting that the White Helmets figure had been was several times higher than could be documented by non-partisan sources.

It is obviously difficult for the news media to cover events such as the attack on the Syrian Red Crescent aid convoy and the bombing in Aleppo from Istanbul or Beirut. But the hunger for information from the ground should not outweigh the obligation to vet sources. Selmo and his White Helmets should have been recognized for what they are: a partisan source with an agenda reflecting the power to which the organization is accountable: the armed extremists who have controlled east Aleppo, Idlib, and other areas of northern Syria.

The uncritical reliance on claims by the White Helmets without any effort to investigate their credibility is yet another telling example of journalistic malpractice by media outlets with a long record of skewing coverage of conflicts toward an interventionist narrative.

Gareth Porter is an investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national security policy. His latest book is Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare (Just World Books, 2014).

Written by Gareth Porter; Originally appeared at AlterNetSource : https://maps.southfront.org

Habib Omar advice about election of Donald Trump

Muslimedianews.com ~ Advice of Sayyidī الحبيب عمر بن حفيظ - Habib Omar

I received a message after Jumu'ah telling me to come to Habīb 'Umar's house. When I walked in I saw Habīb 'Umar and a group of students. They then served lunch and I was able to sit directly in front of Habīb, amongst other things I was able to ask him for advice for our brothers and sisters in the west, and students like myself studying abroad.

When I first mentioned the new president election and that he has been saying some really disturbing comments about Muslims and other minorities, Habīb started laughing, but this laugh was a laugh of complete disrepect. The first thing he said was, "don't worry". His body language was of someone with complete certainty that the Awliyā are on top of the situation (literally indescribable). He then said, "tell our brothers and sisters to keep doing what they're doing, tell them stick to the path they are on and he will not be a problem". (ameen)

Then Habīb looked up and said, "Allāh is the King of the mulk (sovereignty) not any president of any country."

What I've taken from this is to remain steadfast upon da'wah, remain steadfast on the recital of your adhkar, remain steadfast upon the Sunnah.

This is the advice of the scholars and it is highly stressed upon during these times.

Via Sidī Lavotte Saunders, via World of Sufi

Should Jakarta-Indonesia be worried about the future U.S. president’s anti-Muslim rhetoric?

Muslimedianews.com ~ Defying all odds, Donald Trump triumphed in the recent U.S. presidential election and sent shockwaves around the world. Trump’s adroit use of anti-Muslim and anti-migrant rhetoric to win the election has sparked fears of exacerbating tensions between the West and Islam. The question of how much of Trump’s rhetoric, including on trade protectionism, gets translated to official policy is also causing uncertainty. Nonetheless, world leaders have responded to president-elect Trump favorably, tempered, however, with diplomatic caution and guarded optimism.

The president of Muslim-majority Indonesia, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo congratulated Trump on his victory, inviting “the U.S. president-elect to continue our diplomatic relationship to create peace and welfare in the world.” Arrmanatha Nasir, a foreign ministry spokesman, also remarked that the United States, long seen as a democratic and pluralistic society, would remain so, and continue to exert a positive impact on relations with Indonesia under a Trump presidency. He added that Trump’s anti-Muslim posture was nothing more than a political ruse to canvas for votes. The trade minister, Enggartiasto Lukita, reassured Indonesian businesses that, despite Trump’s protectionist stance, Indonesia-U.S. economic relations would remain productive.

But some elites were not enthused by Trump’s triumph. Vice President Jusuf Kalla called Trump “a threat to global peace.” Din Syamsuddin, chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), similarly expressed concern that Trump’s victory on the back of anti-Muslim bigotry could generate new tension between America and the Muslim world. Recognizing that Trump’s win could worsen tension in the Asia-Pacific, Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu cautioned Trump not to “bring that matter here [to Indonesia], don’t give us more problems.” Several Indonesian politicians like Fadli Zon, deputy speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR), have reportedly called for restrictions or bans on Trump’s business interests in Indonesia, in a tit-for-tat response to the threats of a Muslim ban and trade protectionism in the United States.

Despite a lack of elite consensus on what a Trump presidency would mean for Indonesia, it does seem to be the case that the Jakarta elites are attempting to downplay fears of Trump’s Islamophobia, especially among Indonesians, as well as his protectionist posture, by looking at the bigger picture in working with Trump to keep U.S.-Indonesia relations on an even keel.

In the editorials of major Indonesian newspapers, the message was broadly one of cautious optimism. Jakarta Post headlined its editorial “Congrats Donald Trump,” writing that despite Trump’s virulent rhetoric, “Trump’s promise to get along with all nations is indicative that the U.S. under him could do Indonesia good.” Kompas essentially followed the direction of Jokowi’s congratulatory message and focused more on Trump’s impact on Indonesia’s economy. The Islamic Republika, which is often critical of Jokowi, merely reported Jokowi’s congratulatory message without unduly criticizing it. This could be due to the fact that Muslims in Indonesia were evidently divided on how to respond to a Trump presidency.

Indonesian Muslims on the ground were divided into two groups. One group, represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, believes that Trump should be given the benefit of the doubt, as those anti-Muslim remarks were uttered to pander to his conservative Republican base. But when Trump enters the White House, these “moderate” Muslims are hoping he does not enact policies against Muslims, but instead practices diplomacy premised on universality and humility, especially toward the Muslim world. The other group, represented by “radical” Muslims belonging to hard-line organizations such as the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), have taken Trump’s remarks at face value, and hence, consider him to be genuinely anti-Muslim.

Trump’s triumph intersected with politics in Indonesia becoming exceedingly “Islamized.” The demonstration against Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (alias Ahok) on November 4, numbering about 150,000, came about under the pretext of Ahok, an ethnic Chinese and a Christian, insulting the Quran. This arose against the backdrop of Ahok’s decision to run for a second term as governor of Jakarta. Although Ahok had criticized those who misused Quranic verse 51 to discourage the people of Jakarta from re-electing him, his speech on video was maliciously edited on social media, caricaturing him as someone who had disparaged the Quran.

Some 35 Islamic groups led by FPI urged Indonesian Muslims to demonstrate against Ahok. MUI even issued a fatwa condemning Ahok for belittling the Quran. The Islamic Students Association (HMI) also joined the fray by demanding that Ahok be put on trial. Consequently, Jakarta’s gubernatorial election was instantaneously transformed into a national anti-Chinese, anti-Christian candidate campaign. Significantly, the creeping Islamization of Indonesian politics, whereby the secular space becomes increasingly diminished as a consequence, could well compel Jakarta to keep Washington at a distance, given Trump’s anti-Muslim bigotry.

As Trump is not interested in the United States being the global policeman, he may not be genuinely interested in Southeast Asia. The re-pivoting of Trump’s America from the region may well incentivize China to move into the power vacuum, tilting the regional balance of power from Washington to Beijing. Under such a situation, Jakarta may well navigate closer to China rather than stay neutral between Washington and Beijing consonant with the bebas dan aktif (independent and active) foreign policy doctrine. This tilt, however, depends on China making the right move in choosing bilateral economic engagement over barging into the waters off Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.

Should Trump’s protectionist policy be enacted, it could adversely impact Indonesian exports. America is one of Indonesia’s major export markets, worth about $16 billion in 2015. As a consequence, Indonesia may be compelled to look elsewhere to make up the shortfall. Jakarta may well look to Beijing, further illustrating Jakarta’s possible tilt from Washington to Beijing.

Nevertheless, at the moment, it is still uncertain what Trump will do when he officially takes office in 2016. Whether or not Trump will go ahead with the pledges he made during his campaign remains unclear, but one thing is for sure: Jakarta-Washington relations under a Trump presidency are unlikely to be as closely intertwined as under the Obama administration.

Leo Suryadinata is visiting senior fellow and Mustafa Izzuddin is fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

source : thediplomat.com

Indonesia Police Name Ahok as Blasphemy Suspect

Muslimedianews.com ~ Police on Wednesday named the minority Christian governor of the Indonesian capital as a suspect in a blasphemy investigation in a major test of the Muslim-majority nation's reputation for religious tolerance.

Earlier this month the capital Jakarta was rocked by a massive protest by conservative Muslims against the governor. One person died and dozens were injured in rioting. Hardliners have threatened more protests if Ahok isn't arrested.

Police announced at a press conference that the popular governor, Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, cannot leave the country while the investigation is underway.

However they said he is not being detained because investigators and religious experts were sharply divided over whether the comments at issue were blasphemous.

"After long discussions, we reached a decision that the case should be tried in an open court," said National Police chief detective Ari Dono.

The accusation of blasphemy against Ahok, an ethnic Chinese and Christian who is an ally of President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, has galvanized Jokowi's political opponents in the nation of 250 million where about 90 percent of people are Muslims but five other religions are also recognized by the state.

Jokowi canceled an official visit to Australia because of the rioting and has spent the past two weeks rallying the political, religious and security establishments behind him.

It has also been a gift to politicians vying against Ahok, who is seeking a second term as Jakarta governor in elections in February. Among them is the son of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former president. Yudhoyono courted controversy by calling for Ahok's arrest and saying he supported the Nov. 4 protest.

The Islamic Defenders Front, a vigilante group that wants to impose Shariah law, began demanding Ahok's arrest after a video circulated online in which he joked to an audience about a passage in the Quran that could be interpreted as prohibiting Muslims from accepting non-Muslims as leaders. The governor has apologized for the comment.

National Police Chief Tito Karnavian said that barring Ahok from leaving the country is the appropriate "maximum" step to take at present.

"If there are pressures for his arrest, we need to question if that is because of other motivations," he said. "Once again, there should be no parties who pressure for his arrest. Let's think rationally and logically."

Sumarno, chief of Jakarta's Election Commission, said Ahok is not barred from competing in the gubernatorial election.

Ahok is first Christian governor of the country's capital in half a century and the first ethnic Chinese to run the sprawling chaotic city that is one of the world's 10 largest urban areas.

He is popular with the city's middle class, but has made enemies from a tough stance against corruption and an urban program that has evicted thousands of the city's poorest from slums.

Ahok thanked police for dealing with the case in a professional manner.

"We still have chance to take part in the election, therefore, for our supporters, please come to polling stations and cast ballots for our victory in the first round," he told reporters at his campaign center. "That is what we hope to show, a good democratic process for our nation."

The anti-Ahok movement, which has attracted moderates as well as hard-line elements as the city election approached, has also overflowed with slurs based on race.

The vulnerability of Indonesia's tiny Chinese minority remains a raw issue in the country. In the chaos that engulfed Indonesia in May 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis, mobs in Jakarta and other cities targeted Chinese businesses and individuals, killing many.

Blasphemy is a criminal offense in Indonesia. Amnesty International documented 106 convictions between 2004 and 2014 with some individuals imprisoned for up to five years.

source abc news

Democracy must not be measured by religious conviction

Muslimedianews.com ~ The NU prominent ulema (Muslim scholar) KH M Tholhah Hasan said that Indonesian Muslims must be ready to adopt a more mature democracy by at least giving more rooms to non religious ideas.

According to Kiai Tholhah religious conviction should not be used as a means of measuring democracy and it is therefore inevitably that community groups should be capable of living in harmony and respecting for each other."

"Actually Indonesian Muslims are prepared for democracy and those who are unprepared and not ready for democracy are not the people but some of their leaders," he told NU Online here recently.

He took the Democratic Forum established by the late KH Abdurrahman Wahid for instance, there were negative and positive responses and said that its establishment was meant as part of finding ways to get out of undemocratic practices performed by the New Order government.

"I do believe that healthy national life could only be developed in a democratic environment for without democracy there will certainly be a fertile soil for the growth of suspicion, selfishness, tendencies and many other unexpected things," he said.

He added that the process of democratization was absolutely important to the maturity process of a nation "because and adcvanced society is a democratic one". (Masdar)

source nu.or.id

رسائل عيد ميلاد سعيد 2017 2016 - ايندونيسيا

Muslimedianews.com ~ رسائل عيد ميلاد سعيد 2016 فى اللغة العربية والإنجليزية

اجمل تهنئة عيد ميلاد
رسائل عيد ميلاد سعيد حبيبي وحبيبتى
رسائل تهنئة عيد الميلاد
رسائل عيد ميلاد سعيد 2017 مسجات تهنئة حب ورومانسية حلوة

كل عام وأنت نور لقلبي

كل عام وأنت فرح لروحي

كل عام وأنا أجمع رسائل الحب

لكي أصنع منها قلادة أهديك إياها

وبمشاعر خالية من التزييف

أقولك كل عام وآمالك وأمانيك تتحقق

كل عام وأنت أغلى ما في الحياة يا كل الحياة

يا حبيب قلبي ويا نور العين

اليوم ما في مثله اثنين

عيدك عندي عيدين

يا أغلى من الرمش والعين

كل عام وإنت حبيبي, لك مني كل الخير

عيد ميلاد سعيد يا أغلى ما في الكون

يومك احلى و أجمل يوم..

يا رب يجمعنا حولك كل يوم

هذه رسالة جايه من عند حبيب،

 قاعد وحدانى يفكر فيك كثير

 ويسلم عليك كتير

 وبعيد ميلادك يهنئك و يحييك

يا طير طاير بالسما

ميل على حبيبي و قول له

كل عام و أنت بألف خير و هنا

و ربي يزيد عمره كل سنة سنة

تحتفل بشكل ثاني بميلاد شخص مألوف

وتوقد بسمتك شمع غاوي وتفرح بعام أمل موصوف

تحتفل معك روح الليالي, تحتفل الروح كل يوم

 وتهديلك دفئ حبي وعمري أنت بداخله موجود

 * كل عام وأنت عيد ميلاد حبي *

كل عام وإنت بخير وعيد ميلادك سعيد

كل سنه وإنت يا غالي أجمل أيام العمر

كل سنه وحبك في قلبي يا بعد عمري يزيد

 كل سنه وإنته رفيقي وصاحبي وأغلى البشر

اليوم ميلادك وأنا فيه موعود...

يا أغلا دروبي ياغلاي وودادي..

الكون ونجومة على حبك شهود...

كل المجرة تعرف ان مرادي..

اليوم ميلادك وانا اليوم مولود..

تهاني عيد الميلاد للاصدقاء والعائلة

أهديلك ذهب أنتٍ أغلى...

 أهديلك ورد أنتٍ أحلى...

 أهديك عمري و ياريت يسوى...

بعدد زخات المطر

بعدد اوراق الشجر

بعدد الفل والزهر

بعدد انفاس البشر

بعدد حبات الرمل

عيد ميلاد سعيد

أهديلك شجرة تظلل عليك بوفرة

وتحميك من كل خطرة, وتعطيك أحلى ثمرة

 كل عام و إنت بألف خير

اليوم عيد ميلادك

اليوم تغرد الطيور

عبر مر العصور

عيد تغنت به الالسنة والاشعار

وعم الخير علي كل صديق وجار

ترحب بعيد ميلادك بالورود والازهار

كل يوم جديد وانت غلاوتك تزيد

اسبق العالم أرسلك كل عام وانت سعيد

كل عام و إنت بألف خير يا أعز إنسان في قلبي الصغير

اليوم يوم ميلادك السعيد .. نفسي و منى عيني أشيلك و أطير

انت قمر وعينيك حلوين ومخلّينا وراك دايخين

 صباحك عسل ومساك ياسمين كل سنة وانت طيب

مرت سنة بكل ما فيها و جت سنة أحلى ما فيها

 إنك لسة معاي فيها...

أتمنى أن تكون هذه الرسائل القصيرة قد نالت إعجابكم و إعجاب مستقبليها، كما يمكنكم إطراء محتوى هذه الصفحة من خلال رسائل تهاني عيد الميلاد الخاصة بكم ( أي من تأليفكم )، ونشرها ومشاركتها معنى من خلال صندوق التعليقات بالأسفل.

*عيد ميلاد سعيد احبائي *

*****************

كل عام و إنت بألف خير

يا أعز إنسان في قلبي الصغير

اليوم يوم ميلادك السعيد

نفسي و منى عيني أشيلك و أطير

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

اليوم ما في مثله اثنين

عيدك عندي عيدين

يا حبيب القلب يا زين

يا أغلى من الرمش و العين

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

إحترت بعيدك ويش أهديلك

أهديلك وردة بتذبل

أهديلك عمري بيخلص

بهديلك روحي تعيش بيها عمر جديد

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

أتمنى اليوم ما يعدي

و الفرحة من وجهك ما تغيب

اليوم يوم ميلادك يا وعدي

و أنا من الفرحة بطير

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

اليوم يوم ميلادك

و الكل فرحان علشانك

و من صميم قلبي أدعيلك

ربي يخليك و يطول عمرك

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

يا ناس روحوا و حيوه

اليوم زاد عمره

و من الفرح ما حد مثله

يا ربي يخلي لأهله

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

نفسي أهديلك شجرة

تظلل عليك بوفرة

و تحميك من كل خطرة

و تعطيك أحلى ثمرة

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

يا عيوني أفرحي معاه

و ياقلبي زغرد وياه

اليوم الكل معاه

يحتفل بيومه وياه

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

اليوم زاد عمرك سنة

محتار ويش أهديلك أنا

تبي عمري

تبي روحي

إنت بس تدلل و أطلب

(((كل عام و إنت بألف خير)))

من جديد و الغلا دايم يزيد اسبق هالعالم و أقول كل عام وأنت سعيد.

مرت سنة بكل ما فيها و جت سنة أحلى ما فيها إنك لسة معاي فيها.

قلب يـبيك وبـحبه يـشتريك و بـنبضه يـرويك و بميلادك يـهـنيك.

أعايـدك جعـلك طـيلة العمـر وأنت بخيـر وأزف لك باقـة ورد بالعطر فـواحه.

المرسل: مجرد احساس المستقبل: جوهر ألماس النص: كل عام و أنتي بخير قبل كل الناس.

لك 3 وردات: وردة تبوسك وردة تسلم عليك وردة تقولك كل عام و أنت بخير.

أقول بسرعة قبلهم كلهم كل عام وأنت بخير يا بعدهم كلهم.

أنا ما أقول كل عام و أنت بخير لكن أقول أنت الخير لكل عام.

مع آخر لحظات السنه نطفي شموع ونشعل شموع نتمى لكم سنة حب بلا دموع.

أعذب تهنئه لأعذب أحساس يالي غلاك ماله قياس كل عام و أنت اسعد الناس.

يا شبيه القمر يأرق من الزهر كل عام وأنتي بخير يا أغلى ناسي و البشر.

كل ساعه كل يوم كل أسبوع كل شهر كل عام و انت بألف خير.

جيت أسابق الساعات لاجل أقول كل عام وأنت بخير.

يمر عام ويهل عام وأنت شعاع ينير قلوب الأصدقاء وكل عام وأنت بخير.

يا ريح الورد يا صوت القصيد يا ضحكة الماضي الجديد يجعل مساك دايم سعيد

انت بعيد وقلبك بعيد وبالك بعيد بس أحبك أكيد و أتمنى لك عيد سعيد.

تحتفل معك روح الليالي تحتفل الروح كل يوم بس الليلة

تحتفل بشكل ثاني بميلاد شخص مألوف وتوقد بسمتك شمع غاوي وتفرح بعام بالأمل موصوف

وتهديلك دفا حبي و عمر أنت بداخله موجود

……كل عام وأنت عيد ميلاد حبي……

…… كل عام و أنت الحب ……

بحتفل بك نور عيني يا ملاكي ويا ضنيني و ينشد الاحساس فيني كل عام وأنتي بخير

كل عاااااااام و أنتي بخير يا أحلى صديقة ..

اهني اليوم بك انته عشانك من مواليده و اغنيلك في ميلادك عساها لك سنة سعيدة

ما بين حرف و سطر أفرحت الدنيا بأغلى بشر و أقول كل عام وأنتي بخير ..

عقباااال 1 سنة.

الله يحقق مرادك وين ما تمشي على هونك و كل من حولك يهنونك بيوم ميلادك.

تدلل قول يا حبي لك الدنيا و ما فيها تدلل و اطلب عيوني لك عيوني أنا اهديها

ما ادري وش اقدم هدية كل شيء اشوفه شويه

شيخة الحلوين جات ماخذه كل الصفات الحلا كله (الاسم) استريحوا يا بنات

قالوا عيد الحب! وللحب يوم! ما دروا اني في حبك احتفل كل يوم

العمر كله إن شاء الله لأحلى ( الأسم) ..

احتفل بالعام يا عمري معاك وأشعل شموع المحبة من غلاك كل عام وانت يالغالي بخير يا عساك تبقى لي عساك.

عسى عامك سعادة و حب وتفرح بالهنا كله و كل الدنيا تضحك لك وتسعد يا نظير العين

كل ما فيني يهني يا عسى عامك سعيد .. دايم وتعيش يا صدر المحبة و الغرام

يوم ميلادك حبيبي يوم ميلادي أكيد .. حيث لنه عرق قلبك في ضميري استقام

لو تبا مني حياتي يا محبي ما أحيد .. عنك لا ما أرد عمري لو غدى بك مستهام

اطلب الله في زماني ياخذ أيامي ويزيد..في زمانك عمر ثاني كل حول وكل عام

*****************

Smiles and laughter, joy and cheer

New happiness that stays throughout the year

Hope your birthday brings all these and more

Filling life with surprise and joys galore!

I hope that for every candle on your cake you get a wonderful surprise

Wishing you another wonderful year of happiness and joy. Happy Birthday

A birthday is just the first day of another 365-day journey around the sun. Enjoy the trip

A simple celebration, a gathering of friends; here is wishing you great happiness, a joy that never ends

Wishing you a Happy Birthday and many more to come

So on this very special day

I would like to say to you

I hope you’ll always find happiness

In whatever you may do

May this birthday be just the beginning of a year filled with happy memories, wonderful moments and shining dreams

Wishing you all the fun and excitement that only birthdays can bring

You’re older today than yesterday but younger than tomorrow, Happy Bday

May your birthday be filled with excitement, joy, and laughterDon’t count your years for we all know you’re one year older than last yearLot’s of people are thinking of you on your birthday; I just wanted to let you know I’m one of them. Have a wonderful day

Although I can’t wish you a happy birthday in person; I will spend the whole day with happy thoughts of you

Wishing you all the best in the year to come. May your days be filled with sunshine and beautiful colors. And may your nights be filled with comforting dreams and wishes to come

You think you’re special because its your birthday today. That’s complete nonsense… you’re special every dayHope your birthday is just the beginning of a year full of happiness

It’s your birthday and I can’t be there

But I’ll send you a special birthday wish and a little prayer

Have a happy birthday

I hope that all of your birthday wishes come true

May you have a great time today and find happiness in everything you do

I hope that you have the best birthday that you could wish for

And I hope that the candles on your cake go out with your first puff

For then your wish will come sparkling true

So many wishes

So many smiles

Too many memories

Too few words

With one big Birthday

Happy Birthday

 احلى وأروع رسائل عيد الميلاد القصيرة, مسجات موبايل جديدة لعام 2017, مسجات تهنئة رومنسية جدا للأصدقاء والأحباب خصيصا لهذا اليوم
أجمل رسائل عيد الميلاد
Source rasailhob.net  , http://vb.3dlat.net

Top quotes and messages to wish family and friends Eid Mubarak

Muslimedianews.com ~ As Ramadan ends with the first sight of the new moon in a few days, Muslims around the world are gearing to celebrate Eid al-Fitr along with their family and friends. This year, the sighting of the new moon is expected on 5 July marking the end of the month-long fasting and self-cleansing through prayers and charity.

Apart from attending special prayers at mosques, Muslims from around the world would wear new clothes and visit relatives. Saudi Arabia has already announced that from Wednesday (6 July) three-day festivities of Eid-ul-Fitr would begin.

Eid al-Fitr celebrations began on 5 July in Russia, Turkey and a few other countries.

To commemorate the occasion, below are some quotes from the Quran and some English messages that can be shared to wish devotees an Eid Mubarak (Happy Eid).
Quotes from the Quran

1. "O You who believe! Enter absolutely into peace [Islam]. Do not follow in the footsteps of Satan. He is an outright enemy to you." (Quran: 2, 208)

2. "He is the One God; the Creator, the Initiator, the Designer. To Him belong the most beautiful names. Glorifying Him is everything in the heavens and the earth. He is the Almighty, most wise." (59:24)

3. "I put my trust in Allah, my Lord and your Lord! There is not a moving creature, but He has a grasp of its forelock. Verily, my Lord is on the straight path [the truth]." (11:55-56)

4. "Whoever desires to meet his Lord, he should do good deeds and not associate anyone in the worship of his Lord." (Quran - 18:110)

5. "The taking of one innocent life is like taking all of mankind... and the saving of one life is like saving all of mankind." (Quran, 5:33)

Messages in English to share with friends:

1. In every shared smile and laughter; In every silent prayer answered; In every opportunity that comes your way - may Allah bless you immensely! "Eid Mubarak" / MuslimediaNews.com

2. In every shared smile and laughter; In every silent prayer answered; In every opportunity that comes your way - may Allah bless you immensely! "Eid Mubarak" / MuslimediaNews.com

3. May Allah flood your life with happiness on this occasion, your heart with love, your soul with spirtual, your mind with wisdom, wishing you a very Happy Eid. / MuslimediaNews.com

4. May Allah bring you joy, happiness, peace and prosperity on this blessed occasion. Wishing you and your family on this happy occasion of Eid! Eid Mubarak! / MuslimediaNews.com

5. May the magic of this Eid bring lots of happiness in your life and may you celebrate it with all your close friends & may it fill your heart with wonders. Eid Mubarak. / MuslimediaNews.com

6. Sending you warm wishes on Eid and wishing that it brings your way ever joys and happiness. Remember me in your prayers.




By Kabita Maharana
URL: http://www.muslimedianews.com/2016/07/top-quotes-and-messages-to-wish-family.html

Buya Yahya And Al-Bahjah Profile - Indonesia Islamic Da'wah

MuslimediaNews.com ~ 1. Buya Yahya Profile

a.     Biography
Buya Yahya (Buya Yahya Zainul Ma’arif ) was born in Blitar from three siblings. Now he has had two sons and two daughters. At present Buya Yahya and family live at LPD AL-Bahjah Complex JL. Pangeran Cakrabuana No. 179 Block Gudang Air Kelurahan Sendang Kecamatan Sumber Cirebon.

The coming of Buya Yahya Zainul Maarif, known as Buya Yahya to Cirebon in the end of 2005 and early 2006 for enforcing the duty to lead preparatory school to students before studying at Al-Ahgaff University in Yaman from his teacher Professor Doctor Al-Habib Abdullah bin Muhammad Baharun.

In the end of 2006 Buya Yahya came before to his teacher in Yaman. Since that day Buya Yahya was permitted to deliver da’wah at society. Buya Yahya begins to deliver da’wah from zero, no forcefulness and transparent. With full of patience Buya Yahya come to small mosque till eased by Allah SWT to open ta’lim councils at big mosque in Cirebon and others.

The assembly that Buya Yahya guided is named Al-Bahjah assembly, It is same with the name of Islamic Boarding School that he guided.

b.      The History of Buya Yahya Study
Before going to Yaman Buya Yahya finished studying at primary till Junior high school in Cirebon. On the other hand he took Islamic education at Madsrasah Diniyah led by a religious teacher KH. Imron Mahbub in Blitar. After that he continued his studying at Darullughah Wadda’wah Islamic Boarding school in Bangil Pasuruan East Java guided by Al-Murobbi Al-Habib Hasan Bin Ahmad Baharun in 1988 till 1993. In 1993 till 1996 he taught at Darullughah Wadda’wah Islamic Boarding school in Bangil Pasuruan as his dedication to the place where Buya Yahya had ever studied there. In 1996 he went to Al-Ahgaff University commanded by his teacher Al-Murobbi Al-Habib Hasan Baharun till the end of 2005.

For nine years Buya Yahya has been in Yaman for studying fiqih to his Mutfi Hadramaut Syekh Fadhol Bafadhol, Syekh Muhammad Al Khotib, Syekh Muhammad Baudhon and Habib Ali Masyur bin Hafidz.

From Habib Salim Asysyatiri, Buya Yahya had ever taken some subjects such as fiqih, aqidah, ulumul quran, and mustholah hadits. Although Buya Yahya didn’t live at Islamic Boarding School (Rubath) of Habib Salim Assyathri, Buya Yahya got a lot of opportunities to study from him because in the morning Habib Salim taught at campus. In the afternoon till evening Buya Yahya has got special time for almost two years to study from him four times a week since ashar till isya at Rubath Tarim.

Hadits and his hadits knowledge was taken from some teachers like Dr. Ismail Khadim Al Aisawi and specially his ushul fiqih knowledge took from some experts such as Syekh Muhammad Al-Hafid Assyingqithi, Syekh Muhammad Amin Assyingqiti, Dr. Mahmud Assulaimani and Syekh Abdullah Walad Aslam Assyingqiti. All of them are Syingqiti-Mortania and they are muftis from Maliki Madzab.

His Arabic language knowledge was taken from Syekh Muhammad Alhafid Assyingqiti, he studied the last book Thurah Uquduljuman in the balaghoh science, thurroh lamiyatul afal in the shorof science and thurroh alfiyah ibnu malik on nahwu science that was Alfiyah ibnu malik with additional became 2800 nadhom. His comparison fiqih knowledge was taken from a religious Prof. DR. Ahmad Ali Toha Arroyyan mesir from maliki madhab

Buya yahya has ever taught in yaman for 4 years at faculty of tarbiyah and Dirosah Islamiyah especially for female Al-Ahgaff university. Now buya yahya is active to da’wah at society and guides Al – Bahjah Islamic boarding school centered in Cirebon west java and Al-Bahjah council spread in archipelago and abroad. On the other hand, he always takes care of  the activity with his students at Islamic Boarding School.

c.   Buya yahya teachers

Buya Yahya Murobbi Teachers who influence his study are:

The first is Al-Murobbi Al-Mursyid Al-Habib Hasan bin Ahmad Baharun as the leader and founder of Darullughoh Waddakwah Islamic Boarding School Bangil Pasuruan Jawa Timur.

The second is Al-Murobbi Almursyid Al-Habib Abdullah bin Muhammad Baharun as the rector of Al-Ahgaff Universsity Yaman.

Buya Yahya has science flow from the clear teachers. Besides them, Buya Yahya has many teachers, they are:

A.    From indonesia.
–    1-Habib Husin bin Soleh Almuhdhor, Bondowoso
–    2-Habib Qosim Bin Ahmad Baharun, Bangil
–    3-Habib Ahmad bin Husin Assegaf, Bangil.
–    4-Ust Qoimuddin Abdullah, Bangil
–    5-Habib Soleh bin ahmad Alidrus, Malang
–    6-Habib Abdullah Maulahailah, Malang.
–    7-Habib Muhammad Alhaddad, Malang
–    8-Ust Nasihin, Bangil.
–    9- KH Imron Mahbub, Blitar.dll

B.     From abroad.
–    1- Habib Idrus bin Umar Alkaf, Tarim,Yaman
–    2- Syekh Fadhol Bafadhol, Tarim,Yaman
–    3- Syekh Muhammad Al Khotib, Tarim,Yaman
–    4- Syekh Muhammad Baudhon, Tarim, Yaman
–    5- Habib Ali Masyur bin Hafidz, Tarim,Yaman
–    6- DR. Ismail Kadhim Al-Aisawi, Iraq.
–    7- Habib Salim Asysyathri Tarim,Yaman
–    8- Syeh Muhammad Al-Hafid Assyingqithi, Mortania.
–    9- Syeh Muhammad Amin Assyingqiti, Mortania.
–    10-Syeh Abdullah Walad Aslam Assyingqiti, Mortania .
–    11-DR Mahmud Assulaimani, Mesir.
–    12- Prof DR. Ahmad Ali Toha Arroyyan Mesir.

II. AL-Bahjah Profile
Al-Bahjah is an assembly that founded by Buya yahya since in the beginning of 2006 . It was  formalized as the institution of da’wah development in 2010 by Prof.Dr. Al-Habib Abdullah bin Muhammad Baharun. he is the rector of Al-Ahgaf Yaman University.

 Al-Bahjah is chosen as the name of Islamic boarding school and assembly guided by Buya Yahya. The reason is based on the sense of light or sheen glow. Hoped this Islamic boarding school will be the truly lightness and guidance for people of Prophet Muhammad SAW. The word development means as the du’a and hopes in order that this institution is always efflorescent and becomes the motivation of others.

 The institution of Al-Bahjah da’wah development is an institution that focused on the various of religious da’wah sector such as ta’lim assembly, salaf Islamic boarding school, formal education, da’wah media of economic institution, social and health institution.

a.  The Location of Islamic Boarding School
Al-Bahjah Islamic boarding school is located at kelurahan sendang no. 179 block. Gudang air kec. Sumber  kab. Cirebon West Java.

b.  The Beginning of Founding Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School.
Like the other muftis, building an Islamic Boarding School is not the main goal, but the first and main purpose is how to deliver  Rasulullah SAW da’wah , so that  founding an Islamic boarding school is a must.  At first the coming of Buya Yahya to Cirebon in early 2006 was to conduct a duty from Al-Ahgaff University to build the Preparatory school of Ahgaff University in Indonesia. Based on the evaluation of effectiveness problem of preparatory school, that program has proceeded for a year only. Finally that program is given back to Yaman. Therefore Buya Yahya asks permission to Al-Habib Abdullah Bin Muhammad Baharun to start da’wah in Cirebon . Because of blessing and doa from him and other Buya Yahya teachers, it is absolutely eased by Allah SWT to realize his da’wah.

In the second year of Buya Yahya existence in Cirebon, he has opened some ta’lim councils at several large mosques around Cirebon town. Da’wah effort is always developed until there are some demands from moslem people to board out their children at Buya Yahya house although in the first time Buya Yahya refuses it because he still uses a borrowed house to da’wah in Cirebon. Having had a rented house not far from his house at Karang Jalak Cirebon buya yahya begins to accept some students. Despite not all of students who come to study directly accepted but by looking at the capacity of house is more than enough so the enrollment of students are held with istikhoroh.  Then the next year is felt that the place is full of students, one house is filled by twelve boy students and the other is filled by ten girl students.

Based on that condition makes buya yahya and his close friends that live in Cirebon or outside Cirebon to see about looking for a larger place as the central of institution of Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School. At last they choose a place named kelurahan Sendang Kec. Sumber Kab. Cirebon. It is located in the middle of rice field far from society settlement. Precisely on June 2008 the building of Islamic Boarding School was begun. After less than one a half year, precisely on 10th January 2010 Islamic Boarding School formally was placed by girl and boy students and formalized by Al-Habib Abdullah Bin Muhammad Baharun from Yaman.

 Now, Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School has just been at four places. Al-bahjah 1,2,  al-bahjah girl is in Cirebon, and Al-Bahjah 3 is in tulungagung and the other is in process.                                                                                

Al-Bahjah Islamic boarding School has 2 programs, they are:

Tafaqquh and Tahfidz (Diniyyah Murni) all of the funding of the students is free and guaranteed by the institution.

Formal education with the stressing of Tahfidzul Qur’an that guided with program specially and all of funding is guaranteed by the students.

c.  The Basic Of Founding Islamic Boarding School
In order to be a part in creating the place of continuer candidate of Rasul SAW da’wah that uses the principle of Ahlu sunnah wal jamaah as’ariyah sufiyah.

d.  The Official Announcement of Islamic Boarding School.
The official announcement of Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School is held on 10thJanuary 2010 formalized by Al-Habib Abdullah Bin Muhammad Baharun that together with the official announcement of Al- Bahjah mosque and da’wah radio of radio qu-fm broadcasted from Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School.

e.  The First Building of Islamic Boarding School
The first building is a small hut and large hall with size of 15 X 25 M that used for versatile room started from weekly ta’lim assembly and the room for students. The next is mosque with size of 15 X 15 M and 8 rooms for students boarding. After that the building house of teachers with 20 bathrooms and the studio of Radio-qu fm.

After getting the permission from al-Habib Abdullah Bin Muhammad Baharun to build an Islamic boarding school, there is a special message from him in order to be easy in building it. The message is no asking donation from any one, but started from the simplicity and sober. Because the guidance of Al-Habib Abdullah Bin Muhammad baharun, the building of islamic boarding school is absolutely easy without any obstacles. With blessing from Buya Yahya teachers, Allah sends the people who want to build until the Islamic boarding school can be placed. Buya Yahya never feels how difficult to look for the builder and carpenter is.Because the Islamic Boarding School has just been formalized on 10th January 2010, so the temporary evaluation shows that both the Development of ta’lim assembly and the students are increasing from year to year.

f.  Teacher Staff  
The teachers are from Darullughoh Wa Da’wah Islamic boarding school bangil, and from Cirebon such as Ustad Lukman(Bode) ustad Umar(sindang jawa) ustad Ahmad Dimyati(Bangil) ustad Ilham Mutaqin(Bangil) and ustad Rifki(Blitar).

g. The Origin of Students
The students of Al-Bahjah Islamic Boarding School especially come from part of big towns such as , Bandung, Bogor, Surabaya, Pontianak, Bangka, lampung, even from abroad like America, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

h.  The System of Education
The Education system is salaf education , it means that the students are more introduced to religion science.

i.   Visions and Mission

Visions
Bulding anoble moral based on qur’an and Rosululloh SAW sunat

mission
1. To apply the moral values of qur’an and message of Rosululloh wal jama’ah asyariyah  maturidiyah, shufiyah, and must have madzhab
2.  Creating islamic da;wah in all aspect of society life
3.  Creating the self-independent of economic, education, culture based of Islamic foundation
4.  Creating the people who memorize Al qur’an, and becoming the Islamic theologian that will be the representative of the change of glory civilization
5.  Making the professional candidates and entrepreneur that have faith and takua to be islam struggler
6.  To optimize and master the use of information technology media as the power to encourage the struggle of islam da’wah.
j.   Extracurricular
Extracurricular is more guided to practice da’wah at radio, schools, offices, and ta’lim assembly.

 www.buyayahya.org